I spent the
first decade of my career working in hydroelectric development. Not the big stuff, like Hoover Dam or Grand
Coulee Dam, but the little stuff, often the retrofitting of turbines onto existing
dams to take advantage of the increasing value of electricity. (I had a small role in securing approvals for
the turbine now at the base of Coyote Dam, which impounds Lake Mendocino and
stores much of the water consumed in Sonoma County.)
I mention
this history because it led me to a meeting in a small Oregon town meeting where
the local citizenry had gathered to protest the great number of hydroelectric
projects proposed for their region.
To be fair, many
of the projects were bad ideas, proposed by out-of-state investors who understood
that their projects were likely infeasible but were indiscriminately submitting
applications on falling water everywhere in hopes of stumbling into a good
project or two, while also arguing that the federal environmental standards
were too strict. My meeting attendance
wasn’t intended to support the bulk of the projects, but to defend the handful
of financially and environmentally viable projects from the possible lynch mob.
Knowledgeable
observers understood that most of the projects were fated to fade away when the
environmental review processes began. But
a local politician chose to burnish his environmental credentials by playing to
those who didn’t understand the reality of the licensing process. His rabble-rousing speech began with “Only
one percent of all hydroelectric applications are rejected by the federal
government.” One could almost feel the
collective gasp in the room as the audience pondered that 99 percent of the
projects would get built.
The funny
thing is that the “one percent” statement was probably accurate. But its accuracy, as is true with many accurate
statistics, was filtered through our flawed perceptions to yield an incorrect understanding.
It was
probably true that only one percent of hydropower applications were rejected by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). It was also true that only one percent of the
applications were approved by FERC. The
missing 98 percent? They were withdrawn
by the applicant, or allowed to languish in the back files at FERC, when it
became obvious that the electricity they could generate wouldn’t be worth either
the construction costs or the costs of the environmental studies to secure
approvals.
So, despite
the ranting and effective distortion of the populist politician, the licensing system
was working as it should. Only the most economically
feasible and environmentally benign projects were getting through the process. The only difference from expectations was the
bad projects, rather than being killed by FERC as many expected, were instead being
drowned in FERC paperwork. The net
outcome was the same.
(I should
note that I believe the effective rate of FERC approvals in that era was too
low, that many projects that would have added cost-effective carbon-free energy
to the electrical grid had bottom lines too marginal to survive the FERC
paperwork blizzard. But, at most, I
think the approval rate should have been two percent, with the great majority
of projects still going to a justified oblivion. So my quibbling over the approval rate is
fairly minor.)
I offer this
preamble as a way of suggesting that there are many parallels between my
observations of the FERC process of 35 years ago and the popular perceptions of
the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) today.
A recent housing summit in Petaluma, highlighting
the need for more housing in the region, had many pointing at CEQA as the villain,
claiming that the CEQA was impeding new housing projects and creating the
housing shortage. Those with the
pointing fingers were aligned with the investors who had submitted the great
number of applications that troubled the Oregon town 35 years ago.
Playing the
role filled 35 years earlier by the posturing politician, a letter writer to
the local paper a week later demanded that CEQA opponents identify projects
that had been denied under CEQA. The
point she misunderstood was the projects rarely get denied under CEQA. Instead, poor projects, and a handful of good
projects that are unfortunately positioned for approval under CEQA, succumb not
to a negative decision by a public body, but to an overwhelming blizzard of
environmental demands.
I can
personally attest to the last point, having been involved in several worthy urban
projects from which the resources and momentum were stripped by CEQA. Following extended struggles through the CEQA
process, the projects emerged with approvals but into a marketplace that had
changed significantly in the long years since the projects were initiated and
with the resources needed to move into construction already expended on CEQA
compliance.
So yes,
projects do fail because of CEQA, particularly urbanist projects.
And that
ultimately becomes the key point on which criticisms of CEQA should be focused. The most important flaw in CEQA isn’t that it
denies too many projects, but that it effectively deters particular types of
project, the urbanist projects that good environmental policy should encourage.
While
attending the Congress for the New Urbanism in Dallas earlier this year, I
spent an afternoon walking through a transit-oriented neighborhood (pictured
above) with the assistant planning director for a large California city. As we walked, he opined that suburban
projects, even when supported by mediocre CEQA studies, tend to get approved by
suburban city councils eager for the construction activity and the impact fees. Those projects also lack neighbors who might
go to court to slow the projects.
In contrast,
urban projects, even when extensively studied and well-documented under CEQA, tend
to get a higher level of scrutiny from politicians who are continually testing
the political winds. Also, urban
projects are more likely to have neighbors willing to go to court, using CEQA
arguments as a screen for NIMBYism.
Nor is the
planner the only person expressing that position. Writer Leigha Beckman, reporting on an
extensive report prepared by a law firm with CEQA experience, describes how the
projects most
frequently undermined by CEQA tend to be the urbanist projects that objective
observers would describe as the more environmentally desirable. The Beckman article is a long read, but one
that I recommend for those who care about the subject, which should include all
urbanists.
(As a note
on Beckman article, the link seems not to work, but an internet search on “lesson
in California politics” will find the article just fine.)
So, 35 years
after I found myself in a room filled with angry people talking past each other
and willing to offer distorted views of reality instead of looking more deeply
into the issues, I find myself deeply involved in an issue filled with angry
people talking past each other and willing to offer distorted views of reality in
place of looking more deeply into the issues.
And very few either time were truly grasping the problems, the timely
approval of that handful benign hydropower projects 35 years ago and the
unreasonable obstruction of urbanist project today.
I can only
sigh and continue working toward something better.
In my next
post, I’ll provide an extended response to a reader who recently argued that he
can’t justify being an urbanist because the financial realities of his life
require him to be a suburban commuter. I
sympathize with his concerns, but suggest that he look at his conundrum from a
different perspective.
As always, your
questions or comments will be appreciated.
Please comment below or email me.
And thanks for reading. - Dave Alden (davealden53@comcast.net)
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